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PERFORMANCE EXPECTATIONS AND BEHAVIOR IN SMALL GROUPS
When given a collective task to accomplish, a group of strangers will%4
evolve patterns of interaction that clearly reflect differences in power and 
prestige among the members. Some members will be more active than others, 
exercise more influence than others, and be rewarded more often than others.
It is our purpose to set down in formal axiom form some of the processes that 
underly such patterns of inequalities and that account for their maintenance.
Bales and his associates (Bales et al., 1951; Bales, 1953; Bales and 
Slater, 1955; Heiniclce and Bales, 1953) found in their observation of ad hoc 
college student discussion groups that, through time, marked inequalities 
develop in the overall rates of initiation of activity by each member. Further 
they found that those who initiate activity most frequently also receive 
activity most frequently and tend to be ranked highest by group members on 
the criteria of who had the best ideas, who guided the group discussion, and 
who demonstrated leadership. Norfleet (1948) found similar regularities in 
her examination of adult discussion groups xvhich met together over a period 
of three weeks. Ratings, by the members, of those individuals seen as having 
contributed most to the "productivity" of the group became concentrated, with 
a high degree of agreement, on a few individuals. Those who were rated as the 
best contributors also tended to be high on both initiation and receipt of 
interaction.
These investigations indicate that a cluster of correlated inequalities 
develop in discussion groups. If we assume that the "guidance" ratings 
reflect primarily successful influence and that the "best ideas" and "con­
tribute to productivity" ratings reflect judgments of ability at the discussion 
task, then the cluster of inequalities includes at least initiation of activity 
receipt of activity, task ability and social influence.
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The characteristics of these groups and their activities which we 
believe were crucial to the formation of inequalities were that:
a) they were given a collective task to accomplish;
b) it was reasonable to think of members having differential 
capacity to contribute to completing the task;
c) the completion of the task was of central importance to the 
members.
Under pressure to complete the task successfully, those thought to be more 
able were given more opportunities to contribute (questions, inquiring 
glances, etc.) and were allowed to exercise more influence both in terms of 
persuading others and having contributions accepted; and, since the members of 
these groups were originally undifferentiated in status, judgments about 
ability were based on evaluations of contributions early in the discussions.
Harvey (1953) and Sherif, White, and Harvey (1955) found in groups with 
an already established power and prestige ordering that expectations for 
quality of future performance on the group's task and positive evaluations of 
past performance were correlated with the power and prestige ordering. Whyte 
(1943) found very similar things were true of the bowling activities of a 
street corner gang. Our interpretation of these investigations is that per­
formance expectations directly reflect beliefs that members hold about task 
ability, and that those thought to be more able were more likely to be perceived 
as having performed well.
The set of relationships we have inferred from the above investigations 
are only gross "tendencies1, and correlations. Presumably there are processes 
in the social interaction that takes place in task performing groups that 
underly these tendencies. We have only hinted at what some of the processes 
might be. Our task now is to set down systematically what these processes are 
and how they combine to produce differences in activity rates, influence, etc.
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The Structure of Interaction 
tOur analysis applies to a group of at least two persons who have a task 
to accomplish together. We assume the members are all oriented toward success­
ful, collective completion of the task in a finite time period. The group is 
thus assumed to be "task focussed" and "collectively oriented."
As such a group attempts to complete their task, they partition their 
activities into the completion of a series of smaller "tasks" or subtasks. For 
example, if the group has met together to consider their budget for some coming 
period of time, they may partition their meeting into review of the previous 
budget, consideration of future needs, and construction of a new budget. These 
in turn will be broken down into smaller and smaller questions. This, of course, 
is not a "rational" process in the sense that subtasks are explicitly defined 
before they are discussed. Rather, it is a process that takes place as the 
group proceeds, and in "natural" settings the division of the task into subtasks 
is a product and not a precondition of the interaction.
In most cases the division of the task into subtasks results in a series 
of "smallest" subtasks which can be defined by a fundamental sequence of 
behavior that is repeated for each subtask. The nature of this sequence is 
considered in detail below. For our present purposes it will suffice to 
indicate that the sequence begins with the presentation of an idea or suggestion 
or fact (perhaps preceded by a question) to which the members must react, and 
the sequence ends with consensus (probably only public consensus) on the 
quality of the idea or acceptability of the suggestion or accuracy of the fact.
For the sake of clarity let us label the larger task the group must 
accomplish by T and the set of smallest subtasks by t_^ . Our conception, then,
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of the interaction process is that the group proceeds from dealing with t^ to
%
dealing with to dealing with t^, etc., however they have defined the t's 
for themsfelves, and that the completion of T has been accomplished when all 
of the t's have been dealt with.
Kinds of Behavior
In analyzing the interaction in task performing groups we will pay 
attention only to certain kinds of behavior and only to certain characteristics 
of those kinds of behavior. Our focus is upon "task" behavior as opposed to 
"social-emotional" or "process" behavior (Bales, 1953). That is, we exclude 
from analysis behavior that is related exclusively to social and emotional 
relationships in the group. So, for example, behavior aimed at increasing 
morale or commitment to the task, or smoothing tension, or establishing friend­
ship does not fall within the scope of our theory.
We begin as Bales and others have by dividing all of the behavior which 
is reasonably classified as social into small units called acts. An act is
a
usually a simple verbal sentence but could be a gesture, a look, or some other 
form of non-verbal communication. More strictly, an act is the smallest unit 
of social behavior that can be classified within our system. Any behavior 
that is not an instance of one of our concepts is, of course, ignored. The 
kinds of acts we are primarily concerned with are action opportunities, 
performance outputs, and reward actions.
An action opportunity is a request for an activity, such as when x asks y 
a question, or x looks inquiringly at y. For our purposes an action opportunity 
may be directed at a particular person or not, and may specify the kind of 
activity requested or not. We will also be interested in the initiator of an
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action opportunity and, if it is directed, the receiver of an action opportunity. 
A performance output is an act which is an attempt to solve or partially solve 
a subproblem. Included would be giving information or facts, and providing 
suggestions or ideas. As with action opportunities, performance outputs may be 
directed at a particular person or not, and both the initiator and the receiver 
are of interest. A reward action is any act which communicates the evaluation 
of a performance output, such as agreeing with a suggestion, concurring with 
a fact, or disputing an idea.''" A reward action may also be directed or 
undirected and have both an initiator and receiver. As well, it may be 
either positive or negative in content.
Cognitive Constructs
The above terms are all observable behaviors. Not all of the terms of 
our theory are observable, however. Some of them refer to unobservable cog­
nitions that persons may have that are related to the kinds of observable 
behavior we are concerned with. The first of these is the concept performance 
expectation, which is a general belief or anticipation about the quality of 
future performance outputs. Performance expectations are ordinarily in a 
one-to-one relation to beliefs about task ability. Those high in ability will 
be expected to perform well, and vice versa. We will be concerned with 
whether the expectations are held for self or other(s) and will usually deal 
only with relative expectations, that is, rankings rather than some concept of 
absolute expectations.
"^The terra "reward action" usually has a broader meaning than what we 
intend here. We are concerned only with those acts in which one actor 
communicates to another his acceptance or rejection of specific performance 
outputs.
A unit evaluation is a momentary evaluation of whatever composes the 
unit. By momentary we mean the evaluation is relatively temporary rather than 
enduring, thus leaving out sentiments such as liking, loving, hating, etc.
The unit evaluated can be either a performance output or a person. Evaluation 
of a performance output would be thinking a fact is accurate, an idea unsound, 
or a suggestion acceptable. Evaluation of a person would be thinking some 
person made a good suggestion or presented a good idea. Obviously an evalua­
tion of a person and of his performance are rarely going to differ, but which 
gets evaluated first may be of importance, such as when the quality of a 
performance is decided upon by referring first to the performer. We will dis­
tinguish only positive and negative evaluations.
Defined Terms Defined Terms
The terms above are all really primitive terms whose meaning is given 
by general understanding and example. Other terms that we use can be formally 
defined using the primitive terms. We will now briefly state them for later 
use.
Acceptance of an action opportunity occurs when an action opportunity is 
directed at some person x and he responds with some other categorizable be­
havior such as a performance output. Otherwise the action opportunity is 
declined. If some person x initiates a performance output, then an influence 
attempt is a negative reward action directed at x or any reward action 
directed at someone other than x. Acceptance of an influence attempt is
*
any change of the evaluation of a performance output following an influence 
attempt.
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Informal Characterization of the Interaction 
%
Let us imagine that some group of persons, all strangers of equal status, 
come together to collectively complete some task-־say a discussion problem.
As they concern themselves with their task, they are continually initiating 
performance outputs and giving others action opportunities. As this takes 
place they are also engaged in evaluating each other's performance outputs 
and communicating these evaluations with reward actions. During the early 
phases of this process we believe that most of this behavior takes place in a 
random manner--particularly the distribution of action opportunities and 
whether these opportunities are accepted. However, as the members continue 
to interact, evaluations of performances become significant, and under some 
circumstances become the bases for a socially known ranking of the members 
by task ability-־a ranking of performance expectations. Should this happen, 
it will markedly affect the future behavior of the members. Specifically, it 
will affect who is given action opportunities, who will on his own initiate 
performance outputs, whose performance outputs are positively or negatively 
evaluated, and who will be influenced by whom. We further believe that the 
patterning of these behaviors will in general maintain the performance 
expectation ranking and that there are several processes by which behavior 
inconsistent with the rankings is "explained away" and hence has no signifi­
cance for altering the ranking.
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Sequences of Kinds of Behavior
Our analysis rests upon'two fundamental assumptions. First, that the
2behavior that takes place concerning any particular subtask is patterned.
Kinds of behavior follow each other in specifiable orders. Second, that the 
likelihoods of certain kinds of behavior will differ by the position of 
persons in the performance expectation ranking. We will deal with the former 
here and delay the latter till the next section.
Let us imagine that we are examining a group as it is ready to begin 
working on a particular subtask. We will analyze what takes place from the 
standpoint of some arbitrary reference person, call him p. He faces a decision 
at this point. If he decides to act, he may initiate either a performance 
output or an action opportunity; or if someone else acts, he may receive an 
action opportunity or not. These four events־־p initiates a performance out­
put, p initiates an action opportunity, p receives an action opportunity, or 
someone else acts— are mutually exclusive and exhaustive at this time. We 
will represent the situation at this point by a simple tree diagram as shown 
in Figure 1. As we continue the analysis we will add further branches to 
the tree.
•*>
[Figure 1 about here]
If p initiates a performance output, a specifiable pattern of possi­
bilities will follow. He may initiate a second performance output, but that
Henceforth, when we write "subtask" we mean "smallest subtask."
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would be the start of a new subtask and we want to confine ourselves to 
those behaviors relevant to the present subtask. What will follow p's per- 
formance-־either immediately,or eventually--is an evaluation-influence process. 
Others in the group will now be considering how to evaluate p's performance.
To simplify the analysis, for the moment assume that the only members of the 
group are p and q. If q reacts positively to p's performance-־p receives a 
positive reward action from q־־then consensus has been achieved and work on 
the subproblem has been completed. If q reacts negatively--p receives an 
influence attempt from q--then consensus will be achieved only if one of p 
and q changes his mind. P may change his mind right away or counter with 
an influence attempt directed at q. Eventually, however, if p and q are 
strongly committed to completing the larger task T, they will reach consensus־־ 
that is, one of them will be influenced.
Suppose now that the group has three members, p, o, and q, and that p's 
performance is still up for evaluation. Now, whether p is influenced or 
not depends upon the evaluations of both o and q. Either o or q or both may 
initiate an influence attempt toward p and precipitate the necessity for 
further discussion before consensus is achieved. Further, o and q may attempt 
to influence each other by persuading the other to change an already expressed 
evaluation.
We will specify the parts of the evaluation-influence process as follows. 
Following p's performance output he may receive one or more positive reward 
actions only, or he may receive at least one negative reward action. In the 
former circumstances, consensus is achieved; in the latter circumstance, 
the question of whether p is influenced or whether those who expressed negative 
evaluations are influenced must be resolved. When p is influenced, there is
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consensus on the negative evaluation. When he is not, there is consensus on 
the positive evaluation. Figure 2 shows the tree diagram of the evaluation- 
influence sequence. %
[Figure 2 about here]
Returning to Figure 1, if p receives an action opportunity he must 
decide whether to respond or not by initiating a performance output. If p 
initiates a performance output after having been given an action opportunity, 
that is, accepts the opportunity, all behavior during and after that sequence 
will be the same as when p initiates a performance without an action oppor­
tunity. If p declines the action opportunity, then presumably someone else, 
say q, will initiate a performance output. But our description of the inter­
action will not change; only the reference person will change. Figure 3 
below shows the sequence when p has received an action opportunity.
[Figure 3 about here]
Figures 1, 2, and 3 together describe the entire set of behavior
3possibilities that define a subtask. Figure 4 shows the tree diagram which 
contains all the possibilities.
[Figure 4 about here]
The notion of a smallest subtask defined by sequences of behavior is 
an analytic construct and it is not assumed that the behavioral elements of 
a subtask will necessarily occur within a contiguous temporal unit.
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The Ranking Of 
Performance Expectations
Probability Axioms i.
Let us now consider a group of n individuals, p , p , . . . p , each1 2  n
ranked by expected level of performance at their collective task T. We 
assume that this expectation structure is regarded by the group as relevant 
to task completion, that there is one ability or a perfectly correlated collec­
tion of abilities that define the ranking, and that there is complete agree­
ment on the ranking by all members.
As the members begin work on some subtask t , the sequences of behavior
k
possibilities in Figure 4 describe their activity. The selection of a branch 
in the tree by any particular person is not completely capricious, however.
His selection will depend upon his performance expectation ranking, and, we 
believe, will be probabilistically determined. Thus, we assume that a well 
defined probability, ranging from 0 to 1, exists corresponding to each 
possibility in the sequence of possibilities of Figure 4 and that for any 
particular possibilities the probabilities associated with each member of the 
group will be ordered. Figure 5 shows the probabilities in question.
[Figure 5 about here]
The assertions below directly order the value of Q^׳ , Q? , , 6^, anc]
In all cases, it will be asserted that persons higher in the ranking of 
expected performance will have larger values of the probability being con­
sidered. This means that where the probabilities being considered refer 
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for the second branch are being inversely ordered to the ranking of expected 
performance.
The first axiom concerns a... It asserts that the higher a person'si ■*־
expectation rank, the more likely he is to initiate an unrequested performance 
output at the beginning of a subtask.
Axiom 1. If p^ is ranked higher than Pj on expected performance, 
then p¿ is more likely than pj to initiate a performance 
output at the beginning of any subtask t^.
Once a person performs, the question of performance evaluation arises. 
Axiom 2 states that the higher A person's expectation rank the more likely he 
is to receive a positive reward action from any particular other person. It 
follows from that axiom that the higher a person's expectation rank the more 
likely he is to receive only positive reward actions for any given performance 
output.
Axiom 2 . For any given performance output, if p^ is ranked higher 
than Pj on expected performance, then p^ is more likely 
to receive a positive reward action than is pj.
If a member receives at least one negative reward action, the person who 
is lower in expectation rank should be influenced more often. Axiom 3 
asserts this.
Axiom 3 . For any given number of influence attempts, if p¿ is 
ranked higher than Pj on expected performance, then 
p^. is more likely to accept influence than p^.
If at the start of a subproblem t, , all members refrain from initiationK.
of a performance output, then an action opportunity will almost certainly be 
initiated. The allocation of action opportunities should be related to the 
expectation structure.
Axiom 4 . For any subtask t^, if is ranked higher than pj 
on expected performance, p^ is more likely than 
Pj to receive an action opportunity.
And finally, not only are higher ranking members more likely to receive
>
action opportunities, they are also more likely to accept them.
Axiom 5 . For any subtask t^, if p^ is ranked higher than pj 
on expected performance, then p¿ is more likely to 
accept an action opportunity at the beginning of t^.
Some Consequences
To further display the nature of this axiom structure as well as illustrate 
its use, we now consider two fairly direct consequences of these assertions. 
These consequences are also of substantive interest in their own right.
Performance Outputs 
The likelihood of a person making a performance output is determined by 
the likelihood that he initiates a performance output without being requested, 
the likelihood that he is requested to perform, and the likelihood that he 
performs when he is requested. The probability that he initiates a performance 
output without a prior action opportunity is 0׳ ; that he is requested to 
perform is 0^; and that he responds to an action opportunity is Thus the
probability that a person initiates a performance output is
3 ״+ 1״  V
Since (Axiom 1), (Axiom 4), and ^  (Axiom 5) are all larger for 
higher ranked persons, it follows that for p^ ranked higher than p ^ ,
(i.D («3 +״ )״!. < (״311+» ״ J «!j).
That is, the higher the rank of a person in the expectation ranking, the 
greater the likelihood that he will make performance outputs.
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Acceptance of Performance Outputs 
Whether or not a given performance output is accepted (positive consensus 
on evaluation of the performance output) depends both upon the reaction to 
it (whether all positive or some negative) and upon the outcome of the 
influence struggle in the case of at least one negative reaction. The pro­
bability that a person's performance output is accepted has four additive 
components :
1 a e A * 1 1
2 Ct e X 1 2  2
•» o6 ׳ e
3 1 1
a qi 6 e X
3 1 2  2
Components 1 and 3 are directly ranked by the axioms, but components 2 and
4 are not ranked by anything in the formulation up to now. So an additional 
assumption is required before the probability of having a performance output 
accepted can be ranked.
A substantively reasonable assumption is that the success of higher 
ranked persons at influencing others compensates for the higher frequency 
of received influence attempts for a given performance of lower ranked persons
Thus ,
/ X > e  / e (.1.2; 2i / 2j 2j 2i
From (1.2) and the axioms, we have:
Theorem 1 . For p^ ranked higher than p^ on expected performance,
a .
b.
c .
d.
If Theorem 1 is true, then the acceptance of performance outputs is ranked by 
performance expectations.
Maintenance of Expectation Rankings 
Theorem 1 plays a fundamental role in the maintenance of ranking 
structures based on performance expectations. The four assertions of the 
theorem represent sufficient conditions for such a structure to remain un­
changed. So if all four conditions held for all pairs of members, no change 
of positions in the ranking structure would be anticipated. However, these 
conditions are undoubtedly not the minimum conditions necessary for maintenance. 
Some amount of violation of them would probably be tolerated without resultant 
change.
The role of the four conditions in maintaining expectation structures 
follows from their role in the creation of such structures. We believe that 
if for some p^ and p , initially not distinguished by expected performance, 
p^ emerged as having had more performance outputs accepted than p^, then p^ 
would be ranked higher by the group than p^ on expected performance. In other 
words, evaluations of past performances are the basis for expectations about 
future performances, and once such expectations are established, evaluations 
of present performances are crucial to the maintenance of those expectations.
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׳0e >li li lj lja
a e X > q׳ e X 
li 2i 2i lj 2 j 2 j
a à e a6 ׳ e
3i li li 3j lj lj
a6 ׳ e \ > Q 6 ׳ e X
3i li 2i 2i 3j lj 2 j 2 j
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An Experiment
We will present experimental evidence in support of the assertion that
if p, is ranked higher than p. on expected performance, then p, is less likely
1  ‘J  1t
to accept influence, Axiom 3. The experimental situation was constructed so 
that who initiates performance outputs and action opportunities, who receives 
action opportunities, the number of consecutive performance outputs, and the 
number of influence attempts per performance have all been controlled and 
fixed. Performance expectations for two persons were manipulated and acceptance 
of influence was examined as a dependent variable.
The experiment consisted of two parts, called phase 1 and phase 2. Two 
subjects participated in each experiment. In phase 1 they were both publicly 
given fictitious scores on a test which was purported to measure their ability 
at the phase 2 task. This was the manipulation of performance expectations.
In phase 2 they were required on repeated occasions (i.e., trials) to select 
one of two alternatives as the correct answer to a word association problem.
The selection of a correct answer had two stages. Every time a subject was 
presented with a set of alternatives, he first made a preliminary selection 
and exchanged information with his partner as to which alternative each 
initially selected. The subjects could not verbally communicate nor even see 
each other but indicated their choices to the experimenter and each other 
using a system of lights and push-button switches. Following the initial 
choice, each made a private final choice taking the information he had 
received from the other into account. The purpose of this initial choice - 
final choice sequence was defined as seeing how well they worked together *1as a 
team." They were told, moreover, that their final decision would be evaluated 
in terms of a "team score." The team score was simply the sum of the number 
of "correct" final decisions which each made, with no record kept of the
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relative contributions of each. The requirement that subjects make a 
communicated initial choice is equivalent to their having been given a manda­
tory action opportunity, and the choice itself constitutes a performance out-
i ״>
put. Thus action opportunities could not be unequally distributed nor could 
a subject decline to make a performance output.
To create the possibility for each subject to accept influence from the 
other and to standardize receipt of influence attempts, the experimenter 
controlled the exchange of initial choice information. Except for three trials 
of the total of twenty-five (5, 13, 20), the subjects were led to believe 
that they initially disagreed. They had to decide each time whether "he's 
right and I'm wrong," which would be a change of evaluation and hence acceptance 
of influence, or whether "I'm right and he's wrong," which would be non- 
acceptance of influence.
The phase 2 task problems consisted of sets of words such as the one 
shown below.
YESTERDAY
(A) (B)
TA-ICIN TU-SAK
Subjects were instructed that the non-English words in the bottom row were
phonetic spellings from a language unknown to them but that one of the words
had the same meaning as the English word given. They were told that by
comparing the sounds of the non-English words with the meaning of the English
word they could decide which word was correct. The ability to do this was
called "Meaning Insight Ability." Both the ability and the language, of course,
were fictitious. Subjects were shown a total of twenty-five different word sets.
Each word set was selected, on the basis of a pretest, so as to represent 
as ambiguous a choice as possible. Only those word sets which elicited
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selection of one alternative 40-607, of the time when shown to approximately 
100 pretest subjects were used in the task sequence. The order of presenta­
tion of the word sets was randomized.
>
The manipulation of competence at "Meaning Insight," hence the manipula­
tion of performance expectations, was accomplished in phase 1 by showing the 
subjects a series of twelve word sets very similar to those described above.
In each of these word sets the role of the English and non-English words was 
reversed as in the example below.
LU-BOYEL
(A) (B)
LOVE SOFTNESS
Subjects were given fictitious scores for their choices on those twelve word 
sets. Their scores were interpreted to them as representing rare occurrences 
and as being either superior or poor, so that each subject was let to believe 
either that he was exceptionally good or exceptionally bad, and either that 
his partner was exceptionally good or exceptionally bad. Hence, there were 
four performance expectation conditions:
(a) high self, low other
(b) high self, high other
(c) low self, low other
(d) low self, high other
It was predicted that the rate of acceptance of influence would be greatest 
in condition (d), least in (a), and that conditions (b) and (c) would have the 
same rate.
The subjects were 162 Stanford University undergraduates who volunteered 
from various university classes. They were paid $1.25 per hour for partici­
pating. Forty-two were eliminated from the analysis for becoming suspicious 
or failing to accept one or more of the manipulations in the experiment.
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Table 1 presents the mean proportion of final choices, for all trials, 
where subjects in each condition declined to accept influence (i.e., their 
final choice was the same as their initial choice).
>
[Table 1 about here]
It is clear that the data confirm the order predicted by the theory and that 
those who were expected to perform relatively better decline to accept influence 
more.
The above ordering also holds true throughout the series of trials.
Chart 1, shown below, is a graph of the proportion of non-acceptance of in­
fluence for blocks of three trials.
[Chart 1 about here]
The rates for all conditions are constant, they never overlap [except, 
of course, for (b) and (c)], and the ordering is as predicted. It is especially 
interesting to note how similar conditions (b) and (c) are. The curves very 
clearly suggest that in this situation, at least, relative, not absolute, 
performance expectations affect acceptance of influence.
Summary
We began this paper with some speculations from the literature that power 
and prestige orderings in small groups are related to participation rates, 
distributions of rewards and evaluations, and to exercise of influence. We 
formalized these speculations in a set of Axioms which describe the process of 
problem solving interaction in small groups. Experimental evidence was presented 
which confirms one assertion־־that a person expected to perform well relative 
to another person will accept influence less than if expected to perform 
relatively poorly.
Condition Proportion Number
high self, low other . *^J oo 29
high self, high other .67 31
low self, low other .65 32
low self, high other .44 28
Table 1
Proportion of final choices where 
subjects declined to accept influence
90 ,
Chart 1. Proportion of non-acceptance of 
influence for blocks of 'three trials
What remains to be done is to gather additional evidence for other
*
assertions of the theory and for specific derivations from the theory. The 
experimental situation described can be easily modified to carry out such
*>
experiments. In addition to providing evidence for the theory, such experiments 
should lead to refinement of the theory and more precise statements of its 
axioms.
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